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Uncolonizable

Last night we watched “Battle: Los Angeles,” which is a fairly bad movie about an alien invasion of the world, but which focuses upon the front in Los Angeles, mostly Santa Monica. At no point is the perspective of the aliens addressed, but we spend a great deal of time on the rather boring backstories of a number of the characters: a Marine about to retire with a shady past, a Marine who lost his brother (coincidentally, his brother was in the same unit as the retiring Marine) and who is about to be deployed for the first time, another Marine who seems to have PTSD, and so on. All of these, presumably, are to humanize the Marines and give us reason to identify with them. Throughout the movie–as the Marines find access to televisions–we are treated to updates from a talking-head expert on CNN who has hypothesized that the aliens are attempting to colonize Earth in order to secure access to water (but, of course, “Earth” is constantly reduced to “America”): the cyborg organic/machine hybrids which seem to do the fighting–whether they are centrally controlled drones or somewhat autonomous soldiers–appear to run on water.

We then have a rather crude comparison being made: Americans with respect to oil are the same as the aliens with respect to water. We are therefore being asked to identify with the colonizer-come-colonized. So long as the Marines are colonizing–that is, doing their traumatic tours of duty in Afghanistan or Iraq–there is no problem. But, once the colonizers are transformed into the colonized, there is a major problem. The point of the film, then, is to re-inscribe the lost role of America as colonizer and erase the aberration of America as colony. (Poignant, perhaps, that we watched it on what is the American Thanksgiving weekend which, among its ideological functions, is to represent America’s past as a partnership rather than a colonial invasion.)

While the main character–the retiring but called back into active service Marine (stop-loss, if you will)–is the one who is supposed to gather our attention: how he has been traumatized by the death of his team on the previous tour of duty, how he was the only survivor, how he was supposed to die, how everyone around him thinks he is responsible for the deaths of those Marines, and how his devotion to his duty has prevented him from having a wife and child (don’t worry: through performing his duty he will find a surrogate wife and a surrogate child). He is, by far, the least interesting character. Our attention should be focused on the one Marine–the team’s medic training to become a doctor–who has enlisted in order to gain access to America, to improve his life, and so on. This character is a Nigerian national who significantly says at one point, “I’d rather be in Afghanistan.” Again we are dealing with the play of colonized/colonizer: the colonized Nigerian wants to be the colonizer. The Nigerian soldier would rather be in Afghanistan colonizing than be in the United States resisting a colonial force.

Given the constant flip-flopping between colonized and colonizing, it is strange that we are being asked to identify with the colonized: the destroyed civilians and the rag-tag Marines who will single-handedly resist the alien occupation. But, this is illusionary because we are only being asked to identify with the colonized in order to re-inscribe the natural order of things; that is, we must resist the possibility that America can fall to a foreign force with unknown motives even though their technology is vastly superior and overwhelmingly powerful–no matter how strong the enemy, worry not, because we will prevail–and we must only see the truth of American exceptionalism. America is the uncolonizable; America is the only legitimate colonial force–even the colonized agree with that.

Now, this is a strange genre of film. The majority of stories about the destruction of the United States have auto-immune causes–losing control of military technology (“Terminator,” “Battlestar Galactica”–the killer robot hypothesis), a sudden viral epidemic (the various zombie and “contagion” movies), or a secret cabal or government within the government. The America-destroyed-by-aliens genre is comparatively narrow. Off the top of my head, I can only think of “Mars Attacks,” “War of the Worlds,” “Independence Day,” “Skyline” (which came out almost at the same time as “Battle: Los Angeles”) and, of course, “Battle: Los Angeles.” What’s particularly interesting about these films is that although America is easily invaded–initially, at least–by an overwhelming force of hostile aliens seeking to colonize us for various nefarious reasons and despite their vastly more advanced technology, the colonizers are always idiots: in the case of “Battle: Los Angeles” all you have to do to defeat the enemy is destroy each of the twenty command units. You see, the colonizers are so dumb that they’ve made all of their forces centrally controlled. Destroy the centre and you win. But, given that the point of the movie is re-inscribe the view that America is uncolonizable and that only America can legitimately colonize the world–that is, America is an alien to all others–doesn’t this suggest that Americans are profoundly stupid and their colonial power is rather fragile? Why, then, haven’t a rag-tag bunch of Muslims or Africans or whatever risen up and easily dispatched America? Likely because they haven’t embraced the American Dream. Who knows.

Regardless of how stupid the movie was, at least the images of destroyed cities were nice to look at.

The Paws R Us Settlement

Like many, I’ve been more or less following the Paws R Us puppy mill investigation and, like many, I’ve been aware of this business for quite some time and horrified by its existence. I was excited to read that the whole affair was seemingly coming to an end with the owners of the business agreeing to give up legal ownership of the dogs to the Government of Quebec and pleading guilty to a number of charges. Now, I want to be clear about one thing: this is excellent news for the 600 dogs in question (500 at the time of the raid; 100 puppies have since been born). I’m not convinced that this is good news for dogs or animals in general.

  • The outcome of this investigation will only lead to further solidifying the dubious distinction between “responsible breeders” and “puppy mills.” (A distinction fully supported by, for instance, the Canadian Federation of Humane Societies.) The outcome is surely great news for organizations like the Canadian Kennel Club who will now be able to point to concrete legal evidence that what their members do is nothing like what puppy mill owners do; this might be literally true, but it has no bearing on the actual facts–”responsible breeders” and puppy mill operators alike are in the business of impregnating dogs so as to sell the offspring for a profit; a breeder no more “loves” their dogs than they “loved” the last can of Coke they drank. This distinction, of course, flies in the face of what we know about “pure breeding” and “pedigree breeding.” The RSPCA (of all organizations given its pedigree and its endorsement of nihilistic policies like “freedom food”) has been active on this front: pedigree (“pure,” “responsible”) breeding is every bit as offensive and inhumane as “irresponsible” puppy mill breeding.
  • The outcome come of this investigation will not (as some have suggested in various comment sections on blogs and newspaper websites) have any effect whatsoever for animals on factory farms. There are two reasons for this. First, we already sociologically and legally see “pets” as not being animals. (On this jurisprudence, see the recent decision in Texas on intrinsic or sentimental value of pets.) The outcome of the Paws R Us decision only exacerbates the distinction between “farm animal” and “pet.” Second, the methods of factory farming are already protected under animal welfare legislation insofar as they conform to common industry practices (for instance, section 11.1(2) of the Ontario Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act). This is usually called “the common farming exemption.” That is, if a practice is routine, then by definition it is not cruel and, therefore, not subject to policing by animal welfare authorities.
  • The outcome of this investigation will do nothing to affect the underlying cause of the existence of puppy mills, “responsible breeding,” or factory farms: so long as animals are considered to be commodities–that is, pieces of property–they will be exploited because the purpose of a commodity is to turn a profit for the producer. As long as people buy dogs and cats, you will have puppy mills–and “responsible breeders.”
  • The outcome of this investigation will further solidify the role of non-govermental organizations and non-profits taking the onus for investigating allegations of animal abuse, preparing cases against animal abusers, and paying for the protection of abused animals. Meanwhile, governments will continue to suppress these very activities and the courts will confirm that the government has every right to suppress animal abuse investigations when they are conducted by non-state third parties. (For instance, the plethora of “ag-gag” laws introduced in American legislatures this past year or so, the continued repression of animal activists, and removing the charitable status of animal advocacy organizations.) Further, the fact that Humane Society International/Canada has agreed to assume the expenses of taking care of the animals since their seizure (600 dogs in need of severe medical attention–we are talking thousands of dollars a day) only creates the precedent that other systematic animal abusers will expect the same treatment in the future.
  • There is, as far as I know without a lifetime ban on owning animals, no promise that the Lambombards will not move down the street and set up another business. (Indeed, some commenters on newspaper websites have suggested that the Lambombards currently possess 37 dogs.) And, as far as I know, the Lambombard’s will only “suffer” a $10,000 fine with no jail time or suggestion of probation. (It’s not even clear from news reports if they were charged criminally or provincially.)

The raid on Paws R Us is great news for the animals who were saved from these conditions, but it will do nothing to help other pet or food animals; in fact, the long-term consequences will work against the interests of these animals.

“Monsters and Monstrosity”

I routinely teach in a program called ArtsOne. The idea of ArtsOne is that first year students have a common schedule and take a number of courses on a particular topic or theme. For the past few years, I have taught in the “Criminal Matters” cluster, which, as the title suggests, is largely an introduction to the criminology program–although I do my best to stretch the meaning of criminology. At the behest of the Dean who runs ArtsOne, I have been working on a proposal this past week to introduce a new ArtsOne cluster. The Dean requested a cluster that would take up monsters and he specifically mentioned zombies and vampires. After a number of inquiries with faculty and senior graduate students and the recently PhD-ed, I found two other people willing to participate in this project, which we have decided to call “Monsters and Monstrosity.” Should the proposal be approved, I will teach a First Year Seminar in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology called “Sociology of the Weird and Apocalyptic,” André Loiselle will teach a First Year Seminar in the School for Studies in Art and Culture called “Movie Monstrosity: A Creepy Fascination with the Abnormal,” and Aalya Ahmad will teach a First Year Seminar in the Department of English called “Literary Monsters from Grendel to Zombies.” The draft proposal–for the curious or for those looking to set-up your own monster-based learning community–can be read here [pdf].

Letter to Chief White on #OccupyOttawa

Dear Chief White,

I read in the paper today, in reference to foreclosing the Occupy Ottawa camp, that Ottawa Police Services “want[s] this to be a non-event.” To the end of the achieving that result, could I give you some advice? In order to ensure that the foreclosure is “a non-event” I suggest that your officers refrain from pepper spraying, beating, and shooting protestors with rubber bullets. Do we really want the next Lt. John Pike to be among Ottawa’s finest? I certainly hope not. Indeed, rather than foreclosing the camp, I suggest that you and your officers make a display of solidarity with the protesters: you should promise to refuse to carry out any politically motivated order to forcibly remove legitimate dissent from public spaces, including but not limited to, the Occupy Ottawa camp. Take direction from the police of Edmonton and Calgary: do the hard thing and stand up for the legitimacy of dissent rather than acting as repo men for the city. Indeed, Ottawa Police Services should promise to protect protesters–should the Occupiers be willing to have your protection–from any and all violence directed at the Occupiers and their camp.

Yours most sincerely,

Craig McFarlane

Competence

For the past couple of days, I’ve been working on a chapter for an edited collection on relational sociology. Predictably, my contribution deals with non-humans. I commented earlier on the strange dogmatic humanism of critical realism. This dogmatic humanism is shared by the relational sociologists. This recourse to a metaphysical humanism usually occurs in the context of what claims to be a critique of actor-network theory. Nick Crossley, for instance, provides the following argument against ANT:

How, for example, is the sociologist to include a household pet as an actor in her analysis without having the knowledge of the animal behaviourist? And if the pet is infect by (`has connections with’) a particular virus, and this too is part of the story, then the sociologist must be a virologist too.

The argument is rather stunning: if you do not have professional qualifications and/or advanced training in a given area, then you are not sufficiently competent to engage in sociological analysis of that area. How, might I ask, does a medical sociologist do research without an M.D.? Admittedly, I’ve only met a few medical sociologists, but none of them had medical or even nursing degrees. They did, however, have sociology degrees. If an M.D. is not necessary, should they have a degree in, say, epidemiology? Again, those sociologists who study the spread of disease in society that I have met do not have advanced degrees in epidemiology. What about a sociologist who is interested in studying how gay men live with AIDS–should that sociologist be both gay, male, have AIDS and an advanced degree in epidemiology, virology, or medicine? I think not. What about the economic sociologist: should they have a PhD in both sociology and in economics? If not, how are they to do their work without such training?

To put this in other terms, why can’t the methods and theories of sociology be used to study non-humans? Admittedly, this would require work–theoretical and methodological–on the part of the sociologist who would seek to study such things, but this is not an unsurmountable obstacle. But then, it isn’t clear how you can talk about humans–whatever that means–without also talking about non-humans–again, whatever that means. It is not as though humans (contrary to the dogmatic humanists) live in a zone of autonomy completely detached from relations with non-humans. How would I write this post without non-humans? How would I even be sitting down on a chair? At a desk? In a room in a room? In a town? A serious answer is expected.

As a result, we come to an observation made by Emile Durkheim in his Rules of the Sociological Method: to study something sociologically is not the same as studying something biologically. That is, it is clearly the case that all living beings must eat. This is a biological question–why must organisms eat? How do they digest and process foods? And the like. The sociological question is–as E.P. Thompson pointed out in his essay on bread riots–”feeling hungry, what do people [or animals] do?” Or, again as Thompson points out, “feeling randy, what do people [or animals] do?”

“Voter Apathy”

It is both puzzling and instructive that the pundits, that is to say the liberals who believe the essence of political action to be “discuss, discuss, discuss” (here we might recall Carl Schmitt’s quip about liberals confronted with the question, “Christ or Barabbas?”) whereby discussion is presented in its essence in the vote (i.e., an opinion marked on a piece of paper, anonymously), are so upset by the sheer audacity of “the people” to refuse to vote. You see, only 49.2% of eligible votes bothered to turn out to vote in Ontario on Thursday. We are told that this is a sad comparison to 1971 when 73.5% of the electorate bothered to vote; the youth these days! iPads? What about I-Vote?! The winning party, the Liberals, secured what their leader calls “a major minority” (talk about Rumsfeldian epistemology!) by winning 53 seats out of a total of 107. Relative to “the popular vote,” which does not exist in Canada by the way, this means that the Liberals secured a third term on roughly 18% of votes cast. This has lead to predictable results among the punditocracy: what must we do to make more people vote? On the radio the other night, I was told that I should be dragged into public and kicked in the balls because I, unlike the caller, was apathetic. Not literally I, of course, but my fellow “apathetic” refuseniks.

When confronted with the option of centrist-liberalism (NDP which we should not confuse with a “socialist” party: it is a Tony Blair-ite/Clintonian “Third Way” party–the “socialism” of the NDP is tantamount to saying “hi” to an acquaintance in line behind you at Starbucks), a right-liberalism (the Liberals, of course) and another right-liberalism (the PC/Conservatives/Reform whose “right wing” credentials are equivalent to saying the exact same thing as the Liberals, but in front of a Tim Hortons), it is little surprise that no one voted. Oh, right, the “environmentalist” Green Party also ran some candidates as did the crazy Christian “family values” party. When there is no difference, all we have is emotive, passing preference: does Hudak’s voice upset you? Do you think McGuinty looks slimy? And who is that lady from Hamilton? A lady? No thanks, we’re liberals!

The question isn’t “Why didn’t you vote?” but, “Why did you vote?” The pathology is not found among those who opt-out, but among those who steadfastly believe that the choice between Coke, Pepsi and RC Cola is actually a choice–regardless of the label, it is still a painted, vacuum-sealed can of high fructose corn syrup, caramel colour, and caffein that you paid too much money for. To vote isn’t to vote for a party or a perspective or an ideology. It is to vote for the sake of voting. It is an attempt to construct a divide between those who are “pathetic” and those who are apathetic; between the good and the bad; between those who mindlessly do their duty and those who do not. Of course, we should note the homology between “duty” and “dootie”–voting in the present climate is equivalent to standing in line for a half hour and then shitting in a little, white cardboard box; that is, doing your duty while doing your dootie. The voter would rather will nothing than not will at all, to borrow from Nietzsche.

Sure, feel proud you cast your ballot; feel superior to me because I did not; and feel free to tell me that because I didn’t vote, I don’t get to complain. Just be rest assured that I’ll ignore you like I ignored the ballot box. If it is impractical to punch a liberal in the face–and, I repeat, there is no difference here between the Starbucks liberals and Tim Hortons liberals–I recommend you just ignore them.

Sausage the Riot Dog

Sarahgrunfelded!

Despite its exceptionally low-pay relative to qualifications, teaching isn’t that bad as far as jobs go: for the most part, I can choose the courses I want to teach, I can choose the topics I want to cover, I can choose the readings and assignments, and I can choose how to conduct the classroom. Few other jobs–with the exception, perhaps, of “rich person who doesn’t work”–offers this degree of occupational freedom. I like teaching in a university, but I wouldn’t, for instance, like teaching in a high school where the curriculum is more or less mandated by the provincial Ministry of Education.

But this doesn’t mean there aren’t drawbacks. More often than not, students are unengaged in the material, even when it is really great material. They are much more interested in marks than in thought and discussion. Some are even absolutely unprepared to write a sentence. Notwithstanding these drawbacks, there are usually at least a few students who are genuinely interested in learning and the material.

However, every so often you get sarahgrunfelded: a student who either wasn’t paying attention or just didn’t understand the point raises really questionable objections and demands an immediate and unconditional apology. I was sarahgrunfelded last week by a student who insisted that I had absolutely no right to discuss marital rape in a classroom because it might “offend someone” and, worse, that my illustration of Max Weber’s concept of charismatic domination with the example of Jesus opened up Christians to mockery and abuse.

This wasn’t the first time I was sarahgrunfelded. A few years ago–incidentally, in the same class–a student complained to my Chair because I used the word “fuck” once or twice in lecture. Admittedly, most professors do not swear during class–which is their decision and right–but I don’t see how language could possibly be construed as reasonable grounds for a complaint. Fortunately, my Chair agreed with me and we found a solution to the problem: the student was granted registration into a class which was already full; incidentally, the class the student actually wanted to take.

What was interesting about the most recent sarahgrunfelding was that the student didn’t object (at least as far as I could tell) on the basis of facts: the student didn’t attempt to deny that Jesus wasn’t an example of charismatic domination nor did the student attempt to deny that in 1982 in Canada there was no crime called “marital rape” but in 1983 there was. Both of those would have been reasonable objections: “You got the facts wrong” or “You misinterpreted the facts” or “The example doesn’t fit the concept.” All of those would have been reasonable.

What the student did object to was that “someone” who was never specified and who the student never claimed to be “might” be “offended” by the use of marital rape as an example to illustrate the connection between law and violence in positivist theories of the law. Likewise, the student objected that some Christians might be mocked because it is possible to analyze the structure of Jesus’s authority without recourse to his divinity thus making them look silly; that is, that non-Christians can discuss Christianity or that Christians can be critical about their faith.

Both objections aren’t just wrong, but they undermine the basis of the university classroom entirely. On the one hand, professors have to live in fear of being sarahgrunfelded for giving what are obviously textbook and routine examples. Fortunately this sarahgrunfelding didn’t lead to my picture being put in the paper. On the other hand, the classroom presupposes that anything and everything is open to questioning: this includes religion, this includes morality, this includes the law and politics, this includes the legitimacy of our communities and our state. There is nothing that should not be open to questioning and, therefore, discussion in the classroom. Any attempt to foreclose discussion and thought must be resisted and rejected. It is one thing when political controls on the classroom emanate from politicians and frauds like David Horowitz; it’s another thing entirely when it emanates from our students. This is deeply troubling and puzzling and those of us in the “business” of education must strongly resist these demands.

(Postscript: in an effort to address the student’s concerns, I wrote an exceptionally long and detailed email; the student hasn’t bothered to reply, but has dropped the course.)

Antonin Scalia, Reader of Walter Benjamin

In re Troy Anthony Davis, No. 08-1443, Dissenting opinion by Justice Scalia, August 17, 2009:

The Georgia Supreme Court rejected petitioner’s “actual-innocence” claim on the merits, denying his extraordinary motion for a new trial. Davis can obtain relief only if that determination was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” It most assuredly was not. This Court has never held that the Constitution forbids the execution of a convicted defendant who has had a full and fair trial but is later able to convince a habeas court that he is “actually” innocent. Quite to the contrary, we have repeatedly left that question unresolved, while expressing considerable doubt that any claim based on alleged “actual innocence” is constitutionally cognizable.

Walter Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” 1921:

For law-preserving violence is a threatening violence. And its threat is not intended as the deterrent that uninformed liberal theorists interpret it to be. A deterrent in the exact sense would require a certainty that contradicts the nature of a threat and is not attained by any law, since there is always hope of eluding its arm. This makes it all the more threatening, like fate, which determines whether the criminal is apprehended. The deepest purpose of the uncertainty of the legal threat will emerge from the later consideration of the sphere of fate in which it originates. There is a useful pointer to it in the sphere of punishments. Among them, since the validity of positive law has been called into question, capital punishment has provoked more criticisms than all others. However superficial the arguments may in most cases have been, their motives were and are rooted in principle. The opponents of these critics felt, perhaps without knowing why and probably involuntarily, that an attack on capital punishment assails not legal measure, not laws, but law itself in its origin. For if violence, violence crowned by fate, is the origin of law, then it may be readily supposed that where the highest violence, that over life and death, occurs in the legal system, the origins of law jut manifestly and fearsomely into existence. In agreement with this is the fact that the death penalty in primitive legal systems is imposed even for such crimes as offences against property, to which it seems quite out of ‘proportion.’ Its purpose is not to punish the infringement of law but to establish new law. For in the exercise of violence over life and death, more than in any other legal act, the law reaffirms itself. But in this very violence something rotten in the law is revealed, above all to a finer sensibility, because the latter knows itself to be infinitely remote from conditions in which fate might imperiously have shown itself in such a sentence.

Pets are not animals

I have long maintained that pets are not animals. The very structure of animal law demonstrates this: animals deemed to be pets are moderately well protected under the law while animals deemed to be food or research subjects or sources of entertainment have next to no legal protections at all. This holds even when the species overlap a number of categories: a dog used in research or entertainment is not protected in the same way as a dog used as a pet.

Courtesy of Fresh Home Magazine, I have further proof of this general thesis. The magazine–a decor magazine aimed a mid-twenties to mid-thirties sort of people with too much disposable income (or dreams of too much disposable income)–suggests “every room needs something living.” They then conveniently give us three suggestions: “flowers, goldfish, a pet.” This is interesting for at least two reasons.

First, living things suitable for use as decorations and adornments are divided into three possible groups: vegetation (“flowers”), animal (“goldfish”) and pets (“a pet”). The implication is quite a clear. Just as flowers and goldfish belong to different categories, so too do goldfish and pets. That is, pets are not animals like goldfish. (It isn’t clear why other non-animal quasi-humans aren’t given as an example of living decor. I mean, of course, children. I suspect the key difference between pets and children is that pets are to be posed near the furniture and art–but never on the furniture: see the Design Sponge blog–while children are to be used in the same ways as purses, strollers, and shoes; that is, something you show off outside the house in the right sort of neighbourhoods.)

Second, in this list, pets is the only category that gets an article, albeit the indefinite: “a pet.” A pet is endowed with a degree of subjectivity that is apparently not present in either flowers or goldfish. The sentence would have read as well (not that it reads well, of course) had it been written as “some flowers, a few goldfish, or a pet.” But, for whatever reason, the editors decided to strip flowers and goldfish of the honour of an article. I suspect there is some significance in the use of the indefinite article–a pet–pointing to the strangely indefinite status of pets relative to other living beings. We know they are alive; we believe they are alive in a way different than other living beings; but the exact manner of this life is indefinite. It is also noteworthy that pets is the only class that appears in the singular.