My review copy of Paola Cavalieri’s (with contributions from Peter Singer, Cary Wolfe, Harlan B. Miller, Matthew Calarco, and J.M. Coetzee) The Death of the Animal arrived in the mail yesterday. Thus far I’ve only had the opportunity to read the titular piece by Cavalieri, which is in the form of a dialogue between Alexandra Warnock, the representative of the “analytic” tradition in philosophy, and Theo Glucksman, the representative of the “continental” tradition in philosophy. Alexandra is, presumably, a reference to Mary and Geoffrey Warnock, but especially Mary Warnock’s work on euthanasia; Theo is, presumably, a reference to André Glucksmann, but I’m not sure why she choses him as the model of a “continental philosopher.” (Perhaps Calarco’s response will address this?) Overall, I find both characters repulsive: “Alexandra” is arrogant, condescending and technocratic; “Theo” is naive, simple and prone to dozing off.
Despite constant appeals to the usual catch-phrases of “analytic” philosophy, the dialogue ends with a rather gnomic statement, one that does not seem to follow from anything she wrote before: “Only the death of ‘the animal’ will allow for the liberation of animals.” It is only at the end of her piece that she actually comes close (asymptotically for sure) to posing the question.
Coetzee’s restatement can be read here.
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Please check out these two related sites on the non-humans
http://www.fearnomorezoo.org/literature/observe_learn.php
http://animalliberty.com
What did you think of the whole book?
I’ve read it twice now.
I’ve still only read it the once, but will have to return to it in the near future. I’m not especially familiar with Cavalieri’s work, but I am skeptical of the strong humanism and anthropocentrism that it is characterized by. (Not to mention the extreme arrogance!) Consequently, I found the replies more compelling than the core piece. I think Calarco is on to something with Levinas – get beyond both “rights” and humanism.
I totally agree about the tone of Cavalieri, and that the dialogue is just horribly executed. (I can’t imagine writing that and then inviting Coetzee to respond to it. Sheesh). On the otherhand, I find the critique of perfectionism interesting and useful.
As far Calarco and Levinas, I am less convinced. I haven’t read much Levinas, so I could change my mind, but this concept of moral agnosticism seems somewhat problematic to me. Clearly, we should be stay open to finding the call of the other in any place. But I still think it might be important to draw some sort of lines there. Maybe I just believe that we need some sort of normative ground, or something. A place to tell someone they should be vegan, which I don’t feel that moral agnosticism gives me. Though it could be I am simply being ungenerous to the concept. Have you read Pollan’s An Omnivore’s Dilemma? He has this weird pseudo-levinasian moment in it. He explains how factory farms have happened because we have lost a face to face relationship with animals. So, what we need to learn to do is to kill animals while looking them in the face (in what he terms the glass abattoir). I’ve never really known what to do with that.
And clearly I’m down with rejecting humanism and anthropocentrism. But the rights… I dunno, there still seems to me some place for a rearticulated formulation of rights. “A right to have rights” as Arendt put it. So, not a humanist or kantian or natural notion of rights. But it still seems to me that the language of rights is one of the most useful ways to turn our ethical imperatives into political ones.
I am, btw, reading Cavalieri’s The Animal Question right now, and so far it seriously doesn’t have anything that isn’t in the first chapter of Animal Liberation. But I’m not that far into it.
Also, thanks for your post over on that abortion thread. I made a new post that is hopefully both more coherent and less cranky than what I wrote last night.
I haven’t read Pollan, but I think that is a more or less common romantic moment, especially in the various “100 mile meals” and “organic/natural farming” movements. There seems to be some sort of belief in “authenticity” if you chose the animal you are going to eat, if you witness the slaughter, if you do the slaughter yourself. (See this on urban slaughterhouses in New York catering to a religious and conscientious community.) Bulliet’s history of human/animal relations puts the loss of face-to-face slaughter at the centre (and the loss of hand delivered milk, birthing, natural reproduction, etc). At the same time, I remember an episode of one of Jamie Oliver’s shows – I think the premise was that he was having quarterlife crisis as he approached something like his thirtieth birthday so he took a road trip to Italy where he learnt to cook – where he slaughtered a goat himself, possibly at a monastery. If I recall correctly, British authorities wanted to censor the slaughter or there was some sort of public outcry about a televised slaughter. (Although I’m sure “Iron Chef” airs unedited where live fish and shellfish are routinely slaughtered or cooked alive.) Anyway, the face-to-face experience of slaughtering seems little more than the bullshit you get from hunters: “I say a little prayer every time I kill an animal because I love it” or “I hunt because I am a Christian and it is the best way to experience God’s creation” (rough quote from a local professional hockey player). The “philosophical” defense of hunting is little better – chestbeating in fancy language.
I’m not sure if rights are possible without a humanism. Consider the rights of corporations: premised upon being a legal person. Isn’t Arendt a humanist? A very strange humanist, but a humanist all the same? Also remember that Wollstonecraft’s Vindication was attacked by contemporaries on the grounds that women’s rights would lead to animal rights – and that is just ridiculous.
I haven’t read all of Cavalieri’s book, largely because the library doesn’t have a physical copy and only a terrible page-at-a-time virtual copy, but I wasn’t particularly impressed with it. Like you say, there isn’t much in there that isn’t already in Singer’s book – perhaps more “philosophical” and more explicit, but that is about it.
I agree that Arendt is a humanist (I mean, after reading The Human Condition, it would be hard to argue otherwise, I feel). But isn’t Levinas a humanist, too? I think the point I was trying to make (but didn’t) with Pollan is that it seems to me that in Levinas the face of the other acts like some sort of deterritorialization machine. And in the case of Pollan you can see how his humanism doesn’t become deterritorialized by the face of the other. And while I am sure we can both think of plenty of times that the face of an animal does work on a human, does perform the basic function of crying out, “Do not kill me”, (especially with children), I still think we need some sort of function to fight the anthropocentrism and humanism of the many others this fails with.
And if we are going to be reworking the conceptual work of humanists (Levinas’ ethics, for example) then right now I am still interested in reworking the notion of rights, trying to dissolve them of their humanist and atomistic inclinations. Which might not, in the end, intellectually work out, and I hope people keep me honest. But just as a late Derrida would move from his earlier criticism of human rights to a world that still believes those criticisms, but also believes that human rights is an important existent tool, I believe the language and framework of rights, while problematic, exists in such a way that we mobilize them to begin to fight the anthropocentrism and humanism of the present society.
Anyway, that’s why I am reading Cavalieri. I read Tom Regan’s book, and that was just terrible. So, I am pretty sure we need to get away from Kantianism, because I am not sure how Kantianism can get rid of its humanism. But in The Animal Question, her last chapter deals with extending human rights towards animals. And she probably hates Kant as much as I do. I’m sure I won’t like everything I read there, but I am hoping for something of interest. Though, gah, reading this book reminds me why I don’t do analytic philosophy. Sheesh.
I’m floating two ideas for post-doctoral research: first, a history of the regulation of animals (limited, I think, to Canada) or, second, a companion to Arendt entitled “The Animal Condition.” As far as I know, there’s no reply to Arendt from the animals yet.
I don’t dismiss the rights approach, but I think it ends up in a number of problems. For instance, Regan’s rather arbitrary notion of “subject of a life” or Francione’s “right to not be property” where stops at “animals should not be property” without ever questioning the institution of property itself. And, of course, property doesn’t account for much animal abuse, such as hunting or fishing.
A dog I was fostering started to eat Regan’s book. She got through the bottom of the spine. I gathered she wasn’t fan of the concept “subject of a life.”
The last line you wrote made laugh, very loudly and abruptly. Thanks for the weird looks from other people.
I’m not a particular fan of Regan’s or Francione’s work. I mean, I guess their hearts are in the right place. So yeah, if rights can’t be articulated or understood outside of the kantian understanding of those thinkers, then I obviously am going down a dead end.
Obviously both those post-doctoral research projects are interesting, but I would be more interested in The Animal Condition. Anyway you can give me an outline of that work might look like?
Francione’s recent post references Ahimsa – has he always based his animal ethics on a religious principle? I’ve never noticed that reading him. Or is he just colonizing a religious principle? Either way, I found it a bit odd.
I’ll start on the post-doc proposal in early fall. I’ll send you a copy once I work it out.
Yeah, I noticed that as well. Not sure. I guess I wouldn’t be surprised he considered himself a Buddhist or whatever. My brother is a Hindu, but his conversion to Hinduism had more to do with his already strongly held pro-animal beliefs. Maybe something similar happened to Francione. Regardless, wouldn’t it be nice if his blog had a comments section, so we could just ask? I am a total hater to blogs without comments sections.
And that would be great, my email is thescu[at]gmail[dot]com.
I sent him an email. No idea if he’ll reply, though. Ahimsa is Jainist, I believe, but I don’t know much about that religion.
I’ll send you a draft once I get around to doing it – whether I go with the regulation/historical project or the theoretical project.
I do know it is Jainist, but I also know it is a major tenet in certain branches of Hinduism and Buddhism.
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