Theoria

I’ve been reading Gary Francione’s collection of essays, Animals as Persons, at before going to bed for the past week. Because it is bedtime reading, I haven’t been rushing through and have only read about a third of the book. As readers likely know, my “animal turn” is of rather recent vintage and only goes back a few months of more or less serious study. Consequently, this is the first of Francione’s work that I have read.

Simply put, Francione’s position is abolitionist. And this abolitionism is not incremental but immediate: all human use of animals should immediately be put to an end – as food, as research subjects, in “fashion,” etc. His position is most easily contrasted with welfarism of various sorts as exemplified, practically, in organizations such as PETA, SPCA, the American Humane Society, and the Great Ape Project. Welfarism seeks slow, incremental change with the far-off end of stopping the exploitation of animals. Francione’s critique is quite devastating and, I think, right: rather than helping alleviate suffering, welfarism has lead to more effective and more effecient modes of exploitation and – worse – corporations and governments that work with welfarist organizations can then draw upon the cultural capital of the welfarist organizations thus granting a certain degree of legitimacy to their business practices. Rather than leading to any sort of abolition or alleviation of suffering, welfarism merely renders exploitation more efficient and has lead to the emancipation of any animal at all.

Francione’s criticism is based on his analysis of animals as property (one could also add an analysis of the commodity, but Francione does not take this step). People may exploit their property more or less however they would like and those seeking to make a profit off of their property would like to maximize that profit in the most efficient and expedient way possible. Hence, welfarism is a technology that at once adds value and legitimacy.

The only way to get out of the dead-end of welfarism/animals-as-property is to (1) cease considering animals as property and (2) extending rights to animals such as to not be exploited, harmed, etc. While I agree with (1), I’m not convinced by the necessity of finding a juridical solution, especially one based upon rights – an institution that has hardly been effective for humans. I’d be more convinced by a moral argument, such as that presented by Franklin in his Animal Rights and Moral Philosophy.

Having said that, I’m thinking of putting Francione’s critique of welfarism on the reading list for my third year “Law and Regulation” course.