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	<title>Comments on: Autonomy</title>
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	<description>animals : social theory : violence</description>
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		<title>By: Eckard Bolsinger</title>
		<link>http://www.theoria.ca/theoria/archives/2008/01/autonomy.html/comment-page-1#comment-42266</link>
		<dc:creator>Eckard Bolsinger</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 29 Jan 2008 22:23:23 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>It depends how you define autonomy and the political. What both Marxism and Schmit have in common is that they describe law as embedded in struggles. Whereas Marxism is more interested in social-economic struggles, Schmitt does not confine his understanding to these kind of struggles. They can emerge from various (seemingly) independet spheres, e.g. religious, economic, cultural, economic etc. In both views, (constitutional and international) law can never be autonomous, it ultimately depends on the existing power relations and struggles. This is why a lot of European Marxist were attracted by Schmitt.

In addition, &quot;autonomy&quot; from what? It is obvious that &#039;in the ultimate instance&#039; no Marxist will ever claim that the state or the political are autonomous from the economic base, be it the abstract capital or the class struggles. In saying that the political can be reached from every (seemingly) independent field, Schmitt also claims the primacy of the political. This is neither a Marxist, nor a classical liberal position.

At the end of the day, you have to decide where you stand:

If you believe in the autonomy of politics, law, economics, art, you are a classical liberal.

If you believe that ultimately the economic structure defines politics, law, art etc. than you are a Marxist.

If you believe that power struggles define law, economics, morality, you are a Schmittian/Weberian or better a political realist (a position which has been defended by E.H. Carr in his The Twenty Years Crises).</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It depends how you define autonomy and the political. What both Marxism and Schmit have in common is that they describe law as embedded in struggles. Whereas Marxism is more interested in social-economic struggles, Schmitt does not confine his understanding to these kind of struggles. They can emerge from various (seemingly) independet spheres, e.g. religious, economic, cultural, economic etc. In both views, (constitutional and international) law can never be autonomous, it ultimately depends on the existing power relations and struggles. This is why a lot of European Marxist were attracted by Schmitt.</p>
<p>In addition, &#8220;autonomy&#8221; from what? It is obvious that &#8216;in the ultimate instance&#8217; no Marxist will ever claim that the state or the political are autonomous from the economic base, be it the abstract capital or the class struggles. In saying that the political can be reached from every (seemingly) independent field, Schmitt also claims the primacy of the political. This is neither a Marxist, nor a classical liberal position.</p>
<p>At the end of the day, you have to decide where you stand:</p>
<p>If you believe in the autonomy of politics, law, economics, art, you are a classical liberal.</p>
<p>If you believe that ultimately the economic structure defines politics, law, art etc. than you are a Marxist.</p>
<p>If you believe that power struggles define law, economics, morality, you are a Schmittian/Weberian or better a political realist (a position which has been defended by E.H. Carr in his The Twenty Years Crises).</p>
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		<title>By: Craig</title>
		<link>http://www.theoria.ca/theoria/archives/2008/01/autonomy.html/comment-page-1#comment-42257</link>
		<dc:creator>Craig</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 23 Jan 2008 04:14:43 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Yes, I agree with most of what you say, but I think my question was aimed in a slightly different direction: why am I willing to be convinced that the political is autonomous, but not the law? Wouldn&#039;t the political be subject to the same social forces that I believe the law is subject to? Or, put another way, if I want to reject the autonomy of the legal, must I not also reject the autonomy of the political?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Yes, I agree with most of what you say, but I think my question was aimed in a slightly different direction: why am I willing to be convinced that the political is autonomous, but not the law? Wouldn&#8217;t the political be subject to the same social forces that I believe the law is subject to? Or, put another way, if I want to reject the autonomy of the legal, must I not also reject the autonomy of the political?</p>
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		<title>By: Rob</title>
		<link>http://www.theoria.ca/theoria/archives/2008/01/autonomy.html/comment-page-1#comment-42256</link>
		<dc:creator>Rob</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 22 Jan 2008 11:52:16 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Whilst I&#039;m not sure that I personally am willing to accept the autonomy of the political, and I&#039;m not even sure that Schmitt argues for it (or if he does is very sucessful at doing so). I think the most tellin criticism of legal positivism in respect of the &#039;autonomy&#039; of the law is provided by Finnis (once he has been reinterpreted). The way in which Finnis problematises the most basic of legal positivists, that &#039;the law&#039; as a concept can be separated from (in his case) morality or (on my reading) its social and historical context. The fact that the form of law is socially determined tends to undermine claims about the autonomy of the law. In terms of the content of the law, well here I&#039;m more willing to believe that there is room for strugggle amongst social groups as to its meaning.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Whilst I&#8217;m not sure that I personally am willing to accept the autonomy of the political, and I&#8217;m not even sure that Schmitt argues for it (or if he does is very sucessful at doing so). I think the most tellin criticism of legal positivism in respect of the &#8216;autonomy&#8217; of the law is provided by Finnis (once he has been reinterpreted). The way in which Finnis problematises the most basic of legal positivists, that &#8216;the law&#8217; as a concept can be separated from (in his case) morality or (on my reading) its social and historical context. The fact that the form of law is socially determined tends to undermine claims about the autonomy of the law. In terms of the content of the law, well here I&#8217;m more willing to believe that there is room for strugggle amongst social groups as to its meaning.</p>
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