A recent discussion at I Cite on Agamben has ended with rather nasty words: I’ve been accused being, “Platonic, almost”! (See here, here and here for the rest of the discussion.) There are two issues at hand in our exchange: one is a meta-theoretical question and the other is a question of political theory. The former emerged out of the latter.
The basic point of contention was a criticism Jodi had of Agamben: he presents an essentialist account of sovereignty deriving almost exclusively from Carl Schmitt (“sovereign is he who decides upon the exception”) and Roman law (especially imperium and homo sacer). Whether or not Agamben presents an essentialist account of sovereignty is, for me, besides the point. (It isn’t the one I want to debate.) The angle I took was, “If Agamben gets sovereignty wrong, how should we think of it?” Jodi’s reply amounted to a list of abstracted empirical examples: federations, checks and balances, and so on. It is at this point that the meta-theoretical question arises. I response, I suggested – and perhaps this is the origin of the Platonic comment… although Socratic might be more appropriate – that rather than talking about sovereignty, Jodi was talking about empirical instances of sovereignty. That is, I asked a question about genus and she answered with a list of species. By analogy, it would be the same had I asked what a fruit is and then she went on to list a series of fruits – apples, oranges, papayas, tomatoes, mangoes and limes. The question one must put to Jodi, then, is what is it that makes them all fruit; likewise, what is the “sovereignty” part of checks and balances, federations, and so on?
There are at least two possible responses: the word sovereignty has no actual content or referent and, hence, people are mistaken to use it or there is a higher level of abstraction that subsumes all of these examples under the same concept. In sum, either there is no such thing as sovereignty or there is. If Jodi’s position is right, then I don’t think it is possible to talk about sovereignty at all – indeed, all of the concepts that we might use beyond the temporary and strategic disappear into nothingness. However, if one takes my side, there are another two possibilities: either sovereignty is elevated to the level of metaphysics and ontology (this is what Agamben does, I believe – but, again, my point isn’t about Agamben as such; all the same, he doesn’t seem to suggest that ‘biopolitical sovereignty’ as ‘horizon’ is in any sense permanent) or you must recognize that sovereignty is both ‘real’ and ‘historical’ – call this one the genealogical position.
Now, to assert that sovereignty is ‘real’ but also open to change – i.e., historical – is not in my understanding a ‘Platonic’ or essentialist position. Rather, this is, I think, the work of theorizing itself. If our objects are not ‘real’ and, hence, do not have any consequences, then it is pointless to think about them. We are doing nothing but writing stories and telling tales. If we, as theorists, want to do more than empirical studies, we must abstract from the empirical while preserving it – our categories cannot become detached from the empirical world, but, at the same time, if they remain tied to the empirical world, then it is impossible to analyze anything more than that particular case. Via abstraction from the empirical, we can discuss sovereignty across cases: we can talk about sovereignty in constitutional monarchies (for instance, Canada or England) and in constitutional aristocracies (for instance, the United States). If sovereignty were nothing but a list, we would not be able to talk about structures in this way – talk about why they are equally sovereign, but at the same time different.
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Can I also pragmatically posit the reality of the concept of heaven, as the religious abstraction of paradise, so that Derrida can be there omnipresently laughing at us? I think that would be valuable for me as a theorist.
Good questions Craig. I try to get around this particular problem (the reality of sovereignty) by considering “sovereign representation,” which is how Schmitt approaches this problem. Sovereignty is not only abstract, but it is also “empirical” and lived. So, it is not that “the state” as such knocks on your door when you fail to pay your taxes. Rather, it is the sovereign representative whose words and actions carry the force of law. So, as much as we want to pretend that we live in a fully deconstructed world, a world in which heirarchies have been fully “levelled,” we must recognize that there are inequalities and complexities all over the place. At one moment I could be a representative of the state; And, in the next, I could be feeling the full extent of the force of the law turned back on me as I drive home.
I went to a talk last week on Agamben, and he was widely dismissed as avocating a return to sovereign (perhaps absolutist) power. Oddly, this suggests 1) that sovereign power no longer exists; and 2) that Agamben’s main point is to somehow argue for an anti-democratic and totalitarian regimes. It was extremely odd, I thought.
Also, I believe Foucault is very helpful in these deliberations. Power isn’t contained in the person, but rather in “the office.”
Sorry, but I really wasn’t sure what Jodi’s point was on Agamben. I’m not sure if she was fully serious, or speaking at the same level as you were. You two might have been having a Deleuzian “conversation.”
hi Craig,
I think this is a good summary of that conversation and I like your description of what theory is or should be here. One thing I like here is that for you the contents are pulled from the world but these contents are still in/of the world instead of added on by the theorist a la narrative. (Is that a fair characterization?) I’m interested in this because I’m still wrestling with anti-realist intuitions that I have while at the same time wanting to appeal to the world in something like a realist manner. Also, I think there might be a third response other than “theory has no referent” and “there’s a higher category” which is a sort of “I know it when I see it”, which would be an indicator to begin inquiry to find if the it has a no referent or belongs to a higher category. That allows one I think to claim that a higher unity is likely to be found without having have a fully worked out argument yet as to what that unity is.
best,
Nate
NotOften, despite the wide variety of empirical instances of sovereignty, positions on sovereignty are ultimately limited to two: either absolutism or constitutionalism. Either the sovereign cannot (absolutism) or can (constitutionalism) be limited by law. The purest expression of the absolutist thesis is quite obviously Carl Schmitt’s Political Theology. The constitutionalist position is somewhat more interesting. If sovereignty can be limited by fundamental laws (i.e., the constitution) what kind of existence do they have? Can there be any other basis for constitutionalism than natural law or natural right? It’s precisely this question that interests me so much about Montesquieu and his contemporaries – they tried to articulate a conception of sovereignty and state power that was constitutionalist, but not underwritten by natural law or natural right. (The standard reading of Montesquieu that he endorsed the mixed regime of England is absolutely unfounded, by the way. Montesquieu may have been the first to theorize ‘checks and balances,’ but he certainly didn’t endorse them.)
Nate, I wonder if you are moving a bit too close to ‘common-sense,’ especially when you say, “I know it when I see it”? If I have a realist position, it isn’t an ‘essentialism’ but a ‘consequentialism’ – I’d take anything that produces material consequences to be ‘real.’
hi Craig,
I wasn’t endorsing that position. It’s just the closest I could approximate to Jodi’s argument. I think common sense approaches are fine short of further clarity – so, if we’re not sure which of the two options you put forward (no referent/larger category) but we need to make decisions of some sort where the options are relevant, we rely on common sense. That’s not ideal, though.
take care,
Nate
Hi Craig- O.k., but even though there are the two “positions” on sovereignty, they are only “positions.” That is, this is one way to conceive of the history of sovereignty and only that. There is really no reason why we must necessarily limit our analysis to those two extremes, if one could even call them “extremes” or opposites. For example, is the consitution absolute? This seems to challenge your statements in a way that reveals the inflexibility of your response to the problem of representation ie, your suggestion of an ‘absolute’ “either/or.”
Second, what about considerations of positive law? What about considerations of the violation of law? Even in an absolutist system there are laws. That is, there are relations between authorities, between subjects, and between the King and his Two Bodies. As Althusser points out in his “Politics and History” (on Montesquieu) there are laws even before positive law! So, my question is: what about the relations of law? You seem to have excluded that above and, instead, focused on absolute articulations of authority, much like Schmitt did in his early Political Theology.
As you wrote: “Can there be any other basis for constitutionalism than natural law or natural right?” My question is: what are these ‘other basis’ you suggest?
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