Theoria

What follows are some notes in what is rapidly becoming an article I’m writing about Foucault’s political theory. It originally began as an attempt to clarify my understanding of Foucault in relation to the writing of my dissertation proposal… these things have a life of their own.

• One is tempted to interject a Spinozist metaphor into Foucault’s understanding of power. I think with respect to Foucault it is fair to say that, like the Spinozist substance, power is one. Indeed, it is possibly fair to say that Foucault’s understanding of power is almost identical to Spinoza’s understanding of substance. Or, perhaps, Foucault’s understanding of power is one of the attributes of substance in Spinoza’s sense. Spinoza says that substance has an infinite number of attributes, but as humans we only have access to substance under the attribute of mind (cognition) and under the attribute of body (extension or matter). If there is a mistake in Spinoza’s system, it is the attribution of power (both potentas and potentia; natura naturata and natura naturans) to matter. The point here is that, for Spinoza, we don’t have direct access to substance (except, perhaps, via the “third kind of knowledge”) and, for Foucault, we don’t have direct access to power. Rather, susbtance is known only through its individual modes and, thus, substance has the illusion of plurality (infinite particular things) when, in fact, substance is really one. Similarly, power is only known through what Foucault calls, without any consistency, its representations, models and codes (these words are used interchangeably in ‘Society Must Be Defended’ and the first volume of The History of Sexuality).
• Because power is essentially invisible, it is necessary to adopt the language of representation: literally, to render present or to present again. Thus, it is not ‘power as such’ that is sovereignty, discipline, government, biopower, etc but rather the representation of power. We are required to distinguish between two ontological levels: the level of the class of forces (i.e., ‘the analytic of power’) and the representation of these forces. But, again, Foucault is not entirely clear and uses confusing language – he speaks of force at the two ontological levels. (Hence, for instance, Glen’s confusion about his inconsistent word usage.)
• While not Foucault’s problem, my problem concerns the representation of power as sovereignty. The problem here is that sovereignty is always defined negatively in opposition to other sorts of power – discipline is the negation of sovereign power (and, thus, as the negation of a negative power is a positive power) and biopower is the supplement of sovereign power.

For a similar set of thoughts, see Warren Montag’s contribution, “The Immanence of Law in Power,” to Michel Foucault and Power Today.