From Max Horkheimer’s “Traditional and Critical Theory” in Critical Theory: Selected Essays (pages 231-2):
The inability to grasp in thought the unity of theory and practice and the limitation of the concept of necessity to inevitable events are both due, from the viewpoint of theory of knowledge, to the Cartesian dualism of thought and being. That dualism is congenial both to nature and to bourgeois society in so far as the latter resembles a natural mechanism. The idea of a theory which becomes a genuine force, consisting in the self-awareness of the subjects of a great historical revolution, is beyond the grasp of a mentality typified by such a dualism. If scholars do not merely think about such a dualism but really take it seriously, they cannot act independently. In keeping with their own way of thinking, they can put into practice only what the closed causal system of reality determines them to do, or they count only as individual units in a statistic for which the individual unit really has no significance. As ratiaonal beings they are helpless and isolated. The realization that such a state of affairs exists is indeed a step towards changing it, but unfortunately the situation enters bourgeois awareness only in a metaphysical, ahistorical shape. In the form of a faith in the unchangeableness of the social structure it dominates the present. Reflecting on themselves men see themselves only as onlookers, passive participants in a mighty process which may be forseen but no modified. Necessity for them refers not to events which man masters to his own purposes but only to events which he anticipates as probable. Where the interconnection of willing and thinking, thought and action is admitted as in many sectors of the most recent sociology, it is seen only as adding to that objective complexity which the observer must take into account. The thinker must relate all the theories which are proposed to the practical attitudes and social strata which they reflect. But he removes himself from the affair; he has no concern except — science.
The hostility to theory as such which prevails in contemporary public life is really directed against the transformative activity associated with critical thinking. Opposition starts as soon as theorists fail to limit themselves to verification and classification by means of categories which are as neutral as possible, that is, categories which are indispensable to inherited ways of life. Among the vast majority of the ruled there is the unconscious fear that theoretical thinking might show their painfully won adaptation to reality to be perverse and unnecessary. Those who profit from the status quo entertain a general suspicion of any intellectual independence. The tendency to conceive theory as the opposite of a positive outlook is so strong that even the inoffensive traditional type of theory suffers from it at times. Since the most advanced form of thought at present is the critical theory of society and every consistent intellectual movement that cares about man converges upon it by its own inner logic, theory in general falls into disrepute. Every other kind of scientific statement which does not offer a deposit of facts in the most familiar categories and, if possible, in the most neutral form, the mathematical, is already accused of being theoretical.
16 Comments
To what scope are these concerns limited? Again a lot of this stuff reads to me like trying to build castles in air.
The essay(55 pages in translation) goes into significant detail as to what he means by, respectively, ‘traditional’ and ‘critical’ theory. I encourage you to read it. As I’m sure you’re aware, Horkheimer originally wrote the essay in 1937. Based upon his name and the location of his institution (Frankfurt), you can guess, no doubt, that he was speaking quite seriously and quite concretely. This aside, I’m not sure what your objection is to. But then, I’m frequently puzzled as to the nature of your objections!
I think what blocks communication between us is that I implicitly subscribe to a far less relativized epistemology, among other things.
I mean,
In keeping with their own way of thinking, they can put into practice only what the closed causal system of reality determines them to do,
I mean, what else would you put into practice? Something outside the “closed causal system of reality”?
Mandos,
To answer your question – yes. Horkheimer refers to a reality that is not fixed, transcendental and given, but a reality that has been construed and calculated structurally(both socially and psychically – Freud made this point the best). Science, he argues, does this. You are right, your admitted subscription to a less-relativized epistemology would inhibit seeing even the authoritative and dominant mode of discourse and also existence(one comes into being through science, we do not understand ourselves nor our world unless we do it through science). Take for example Foucault’s famous study “Birth of the Clinic.” He argues that “madness” or mental illness is far from a stable ground. The creation and subsequent qualifications for its legitimation(or its “realness”) are grounded upon his notion of the episteme, the mode of Truth for a particular era. Horkheimer suggests that science plays a large hand in justifying and supporting authoritatively this episteme, which deems empirical science superior to all. Thus, theory becomes swept under the rug, rendered invisible, unimportant and, most importantly, “bad scholarship.” As he says, the challenges to theory are from those who are afraid of any critical thinking, contestations to the mainstream.
So I’ve encountered this style of argument from Craig before, and, well, I don’t see how it does much given my criticism of it. I mean, try and exit the “closed causal system of reality.” If theory requires an exit from increasingly strict epistemologies, I’m at a loss to find a way to disagree with the critique that theory is “unimportant.” Like I said, this is all ground that I think I’ve covered repeatedly with Craig.
Arguments about science from psychology are very dangerous critiques of a less relativized epistemology. Psychology of that specific sort is already kind of normative, which is necessarily relative—and some would argue that this form of behavioural psychology is inherently misguided and unscientific. It’s a much harder claim to make about cognitive psychology—at least the kinds I’m vaguely familiar with—which rarely says anything about madness vs. sanity.
Oh, and, when I say “an epistemology” or “epistemologies”, I’m trying to use at least a little bit of vocabulary that might be familiar to you, because I myself am not even convinced of the implication that there can really be more than one.
Horkheimer clearly isn’t arguing that reality is indeterminate. While you’re committed to such simple and patently ridiculous readings of what I write — or what I quote from other people — is absolutely beyond me. His argument (and mine) is somewhat more complex. First, it is worthwhile to understand what he’s arguing against. Take, for instance, the following from a paper by Talcott Parsons published in 1945, roughly eight years after Horkheimer’s paper:
It is this style of theory that Horkheimer is arguing against. That is, a form of logical positivism. On my reading, Parsons’ position is next to incoherent, even if we grant him a generous reading: that is, one that separates ‘reality’ from the ‘system’. Even in positivist epistemologies, there is a strong distinction between the description of reality and reality itself. It is the description qua system that is ‘logically closed’ and not ‘reality’ itself. You’re prone to making the slip between the thing and its description.
No one disputes that ‘reality’ is causally determined. The problem is that social reality is infinitely more complex than mere physical reality. It is comparably simple to name laws of physical reality; doing so for social reality is next to impossible. The problem is the complexity of the social — and, of course, that social objects, unlike tables, can act on the descriptions made of them. That human action is self-reflexive (or feedbacks on itself) renders its reality far more resistance to logical description: that is, a system of logically interdependent axioms, propositions, and conclusions derived through deduction. Contary to the dream of logical positivism, social reality doesn’t particularly resemble Euclidean geometry!
You’ll note, of course, that in the passage that riles you so much, Horkheimer is clearly refering to logical descriptions. He refers to a “closed causal system”. In a very strong sense, Horkeimer’s claim is that ‘traditional theory’ can only maintain the status quo because it neither draws upon nor contributes to an otherwise of the present. Political conclusions cannot be drawn from sociological theory.
And this is where Freud comes in. (But not only, of course.) While Freud is a strict materialist and can even be read as asserting an identity between mind and body, he nonetheless places a great deal of importance on the conversion of the real into the the imaginary and the symbolic. Neither of the latter two are constrained by logic. (The laws of physics, continuity and logic do not apply in dreams, for instance.) The point, for Horkheimer, is that critical theory attempts to actively contribute to the improvement of reality. In order to do so requires, at least implicitly, a comparison between the present and an otherwise to the present — that is, to an imaginary or a utopia.
Now, if traditional theory cannot account for an outside of the logically closed system (that is, the imaginary) it certainly cannot account for attempts to orient action towards something outside the system — that is, to engage in acts within the system that are determined from without the system.
(In Parsons’ defense: he wrote extensively on Freud. Also, as an aside, ‘epistemology’ refers to a ‘theory of knowledge’. The plural is, in my view, correct even if there is only one correct theory of knowledge. Which I don’t think there is.)
It’s a much harder claim to make about cognitive psychology—at least the kinds I’m vaguely familiar with—which rarely says anything about madness vs. sanity.
Mandos, have you read any Bruno Latour, Gregory Batesan, Donna Haraway, or Steven Rose? Familiar with autopoesis, developmental systems theory, ecology of the mind, actor network theory, etc?
There are plenty of scientists (Haraway has PhD in biology from Yale; Rose is a neuroscientist) who explicitly disavow the kind of positivist framework you (seem to?) subscribe to.
Cognitive psychology isn’t normative?
Steven Rose is a strict materialist and leading neuroscientist and he detests cognitive science for its Cartesian idealism, ie, its normative BS. Google him. There’s tons online. Heck, start here.
I messed up the link apparently. Here:
http://www.socialistworker.co.uk/article.php4?article_id=6496
And that should be Bateson not “Batesan.”
Good choice; its a classic essay.
For a great intro to Gregory Bateson, check out his “Mind and Nature.”
I’ve been procrastinating on responding to Craig because I want really to put my thoughts in order and express them very succinctly because I think it’s really easy to go off the rails into a miscommunication when talking about these things. I think we’ve done it often enough before.
I have read a very little Haraway and am aware of the existence of the remainder but none of them seem to appear in the contexts in which I myself study, which is, specifically, psychocomputational models of linguistic cognition.
I can’t write more than a box-length without the comment box refusing to scroll. I read that article you linked and didn’t find all that much to disagree with (e.g., I agree with his critiques of Dawkins and Pinker) and wonder if I’m misreading it?
The “Cartesian idealism” of most of the aspects of cognitive science that I’ve been dealing with has always appeared to me as a means to a (mostly rather materialist) end. For instance, one thing that raises much ire is Chomsky’s competence/performance distinction, but I have not yet met a generative linguist who claims that a unification is undesirable or unnecessary, simply that theoretical syntax cannot proceed without the distinction. And that study in syntax doesn’t require the unification to proceed.
continued again due to technical difficulty…
Andrew’s version of the accusation of “normativity” can be levelled against any serious science. No physics, for instance, can proceed without that form of idealism. In cognition, without some form of idealism, we are left with cataloguing idiosyncracies, not formulating principles. The difference is whence the ideal emerges. To my mind, the concepts and the line between “madness” vs “sanity” is a line drawn in the sand without relation to any fundamental necessity except a social need. The Empty Category Principle, on the other hand, can only be evaluated on whether it follows from some other characteristic of the system, not whether it represents som division of the data that we can call Normal or Abnormal..
But then I swallowed the syntactic kool aid years ago and you can just ignore me if you like.
I’ve deactivated the preview plugin. Let me know if your problem persists.
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