Theoria

In the second chapter titled “Mechanical Solidarity, or Solidarity by Similarity” of The Division of Labor in Society, Emile Durkheim writes the following about representations — by representations he means something akin to the symbolic structure of the collective consciousness.

In fact a representation is not a simple image of reality, a motionless shadow projected into us by things. It is rather a force that stirs up around us a whole whirlwind of organic and psychological phenomena. Not only does the nervous current that accompanies the formation of ideas flow within the cortical centres around the point where it originated, passing from one plexus to another, but it also vibrates within the motor centres, where it determines our movements, and within the sensorial centres where it evokes images. It occasionally sparks off the beginnings of illusions and may even affect the maturative functions. This vibration is the stronger the more intense the representation itself, and the more the emotional element in it is developed. Thus the representation of a feeling in contradiction to our own acts within us, moving in the same direction and in the same fashion as the feeling for which it has become the substitute. It is as if itself it had entered our consciousness. Indeed it has the same affinities, although these are less strong; it tends to arouse the same ideas, the same impulsions, the same emotions. Thus it offers resistance to the free play of our personal feeling, and so weakens it, whilst attracting in an opposite direction an entire part of our energy. It is as if a foreign force had penetrated us, one of a kind capable of upsetting the free functioning of our psychological life. This is why a conviction opposed to our own cannot manifest itself before us without disturbing us. It is because at the same time as it penetrates us, being antagonistic to all that it encounters, it provokes a veritable disorder. Undoubtedly, so long as the conflict breaks out only between abstract ideas there is nothing very painful about it, because there is nothing very profound. The locus of such ideas is at one and the same time the most elevated and yet the most superficial area of the consciousness. The changes that occur within it, not having widespread repurcussions, do not affect us strongly. Yet when some cherished belief of ours is at stake we do not allow, and cannot allow, violence to be done to it with impunity. Any assault upon it provokes an emotional reaction of a more or less violent nature, which is turned upon the assailant. We lose our temper, wax indignant against it, inveigh against it, and the sentiments stirred up in this way canot fail to be translated into action. We flee from it, keep it at a distance, and banish it from our society, etc.

A few pages earlier, Durkheim makes reference to the relevance of Spinoza: “Present-day psychology is increasingly turning back to Spinoza’s idea that things are good because we like them, rather than that we like them because they are good”. What is surprising is that Durkheim does not evoke Spinoza’s concept of affect at the social level when discussing the materiality and affectivity of representations.

Of further surprise is the degree to which Durkheim is ignored in post-War French thought. Very few refer to him — even the most Durkheimian of post-War thinkers are forced to present an anti-Durkheim exterior. (I’m thinking of Clastres, for instance.) And those post-War thinkers who make reference to turn-of-the-century French sociology, refer not to Durkheim, but to his rival, Gabriel Tarde. (I’m thinking of Deleuze, for instance.) However, when one reads the above passage, one can’t help but think of Durkheim’s ultimely contemporaneity. Indeed, once one penetrates beyond the traditional ‘conservative’ Durkheim to ‘the radical Durkheim‘ found at the core of his works, one can’t help but see the reason why we should all read Durkheim today.