Theoria

With great anticipation, Bernard Manin’s The Principles of Representative Government (Cambridge UP, 1997) arrived at my door the other day.  The book is one I am utterly unfamiliar with; it was suggested to me by my supervisor, Brian.  I’ve only made it about thirty pages into the book so far (the introduction and the first half of first chapter) and, already, the book is proving to be rewarding and interesing. 

The premise of the book is as follows: everywhere representative government is taken  to be the essence of democratic government, however, in its original formulation (i.e., Sieyes and Madison) representative government was chosen against democratic government.  Thus, the theoretical (and ideological) forefathers of representative government chose it because it was not democratic government.  The option Sieyes and Madison had was either democracy or republicanism; they chose republicanism.  In contrast, for us, democratic government can be divided up into a number of different types: most explicitly, representative and direct.  Hence, in our schema, both representative government (that is to say indirect) and direct are taken to be species of democracy.

Manin argues persuasively that the dichotomy indirect versus direct presents an anachronistic history of government.  The decision was not over a form of democracy, but rather over a type of government: i.e., representative or democratic.  The reason for our anachronistic understanding is that we hold representative government in contrast to the form that immediately preceded it: viz., a hereditary (constitutional) monarchy.  Thus, representative government through its election of representatives is seen as democratic in contrast to hereditary government.

Manin suggests that in order to understand the novelty of modern representative government, it is best to contrast the form not with hereditary government, but rather with ancient democracy, to which we already claim a linneage.  A particular procedure is isolated in ancient Athenian democracy that is nearly absent in modern representative government: the lot. 

Whereas we only select juries by lot, the Athenians literally selected hundreds of different officials and magistrates by lot.  Consequently, the lot was as prominent as the vote by the assembled demos.  Within Athenian democracy, it is worthwhile contrasting offices selected by lot with those selected by vote: the essence comes down to the differences through which candidates come forward as such.  In selection by lot, the candidate puts themselves forward as such but, in selection by vote, the candidate does not put themselves forward.  The result of this is a significant difference in the direction of judgment: in selection by lot, the candidate first screens themselves through opting-in knowing that the demos will judge (and possibly punish) them at the end of their term (one year) as they are required to report to the demos at the conclusion of their term.  The candidate thus self-selects in full knowledge of the consequences of their action.  In selection by votes, in contrast, the judgment of the nominated candidate coincides with their election.  Thus, judgments ‘by lot’ are a posteriori while judgments ‘by vote’ are a priori.

However, what is most interesting about these mechanisms of selection is that competency is not an issue.  In both cases, an incompetent candidate can be (self-) nominated and be selected for office.  While the Athenians were aware that an incompetent candidate may win (in selection by lot and by vote), their relative competency was not an issue determining selection.  Similarly, the size of the population was not a consideration: the number of Athenian citizens of age ranged from 20,000 at the lowest to 60,000 at the greatest.  Consequently, the size of the political body did not determine the method of selection of candidates. 

Significantly, two of the recent arguments put forward against ‘direct’ democracy is aimed at, on the one hand, the chance of selection incompetent candidates and, on the other hand, the infeasibility of direct democracy in a large political body.  However, and equally significantly, neither argument was put forward by either Sieyes or Madison against direct democracy.

More as I read it.