The third sentence of Insurgencies reads as follows:
In other words, constituent power has been considered not only as an all-powerful and expansive principle capable of producing the constutitional norms of any juridical system, but also as the subject of this production — an activity equally powerful and expansive.
The first part (‘has been’…) is mostly easy enough to parse and interpret: constituent power is a principle of immance that brings juridical orders into being (i.e., summons, creates and constitutes constitutions) — no doubt what are supposed to have seen in Iraq yesterday; or at least part of that process. The second part (‘but also’…) is less clear. Constituent power is also “the subject of this production” and being a ‘subject of this production’ is “an activity equally powerful and expansive” as the former; i.e., the principle of immance. The problem I’m have parsing is as follows:
The ‘subject of this production’ is somewhat ambiguous. Does Negri mean that consituent power is the force (‘has been’) and the agent (‘but also’) or does he mean that ‘the subject of this production’ is seen as the product of the process of constituting a constitution; i.e., citizens, subjects, slaves, or any other way of being under a consitution?
We need to back up here, because the preceeding sentences have not shed much light on the situation. The first sentence reads, “To speak of constituent power is to speak of democracy”. This, of course, does not mean that ‘constituent power=democracy’, that they are identical and the same — i.e., a ‘democratic republic’ and a ‘constituent republic’ are not the same. But, to speak of one entails speaking of the other. (Negri, however, does not claim that “To speak of democracy is to speak of consituent power”. This is certainly significant.) The next sentence tells us that the history of these two concepts (democracy and constituent power) has increasingly intertwined the two concepts to the extent that we can’t see beyond them or between them, “they have become more and more superimposed”. (Presumably, his book is an attempt to de-superimpose them.) And now we turn to the sentence with which we began: “In other words…” and he goes on to tell us ‘has been’ and ‘but also’.
Now, we could, on the one hand, read it as follows: constituent power = ‘has been’ while democracy = ‘but also’. But this seems less than satisfying (at least at 12:57AM on Saturday night). Democracy is ‘the subject of production’? But what production? Is democracy an agent or a product? It doesn’t really make sense to speak in either way.
The rest of the paragraph isn’t much help:
From this standpoint ['has been' and 'but also'], constituent power tends to become identified with the very concept of politics as it concept [sic] is understood in a democratic society. To acknowledge constituent power as a constitutional and juridical principle, we must see it not simply as producing constitutional norms and structuring constitutional powers but primarily as a subject that regulates democratic politics.
Hardly much help at all! So, ‘from this standpoint’ that is our present (“the twentieth century”) we see a chain of equivalences: constituent power = democracy = ‘has been’ and ‘but also’ = politics. (The last term is highly suspicious: politics hasn’t been anything but procedure for decades.) But, we must not see it ‘simply as producing consitutional norms’ (i.e., ‘has been’) nor as ‘structuring constituted powers’ (i.e., ‘but also’), but ‘primarily as a subject that regulates democratic politics’.
So, ‘from this standpoint’, constituent power is ‘primarily a subject that regulates democratic politics’. I’m not following… The ‘but also’ is the ‘subject of this production’, but constituent power is ‘a subject that regulates democratic politics’. What is the relation between the two?
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Does Negri mean that consituent power is the force (‘has been’) and the agent (‘but also’)
Yup, I think that’s the point: that in constituent power there’s no distance between agent and act. (I refer to this briefly here.)
As for democracy, well, we discussed this at some length over at the archive. NB though that I think that Negri would indeed claim that to speak of democracy is also to speak of constituent power.
The problem for Negri — as with the charge against the “constitutionalists” and the “juridical theorists” — is that democracy, constituent power, and the multitude quickly become the same thing. Destroying the project that “superimposes” all these concepts on top of one another is the ostensible reason writing this book; yet, by the end, they attain new definitions, but are just as cloudy in relation to one another. I’m not asking for rationalist clear and distinct ideas, but doing exactly what you want to stop is a bit lame!
This goes directly to your last point, that ‘to speak of democracy is to speak of constituent power’: we might as well call it by the same name regardless of what we are speaking about. The valence of the chain has changed, but it remains a chain of equivalences nonetheless.
Heh, well that’s the problem with monism, I guess…
Yes, but I’m not sure how orthodox (keeping in mind Althusser’s comments on Spinoza and orthodoxy) Negri is on the ‘substance is one’ of Spinoza. That there is ‘one substance’ (an old problem), Negri is quite clear, but his movement from his substantial materialism to his concepts is less clear. But then, Spinoza isn’t particularly clear on this issue himself. I’m still not sure on the relation between representations/ideas/images/concepts and substance in Spinoza.
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