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More OSPCA vs THS

Two decisions, relating to the monitor’s report, have been released. The first deals with two issues; viz., a motion by Linda MacKinnon of the “Association for the Reform of the Toronto Humane Society [ART]” for leave to become an intervening party (denied) and costs relating to the monitor’s report (to be paid by the THS). The second notes receipt of the monitor’s report and discussion of possible judicial mediation. The seventh paragraph is of particular interest.

A Note on “The Meaning of Humane”

There has been an increase in traffic to my post “The Meaning of Humane,” largely from this site, and I just wanted to remind readers–given that the terms “animal welfare” and “animal rights” are no doubt going to be thrown around far too much and almost always used incorrectly with the coming seal hunt–that the Toronto Humane Society is not an “animal rights” organization. Like the Ontario Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, it subscribes to the “animal welfare” view. The sole difference between the two is in the interpretation of what I call “the never the worst for being dead” principle. Until the OSCPCA takeover, the THS appears to have held that no animal should be killed for reasons of space or finance and that sick or injured animals should be given a chance to heal and that behaviorally challenged dogs should not be killed upon admission. This view is in stark contrast to the daily operations of OSCPA branches and affiliates.

In unrelated news, in the coming weeks I’ll be posting reviews of Andrew Linzey’s Why Animal Suffering Matters (sorry for taking so long, Andrew!), Stanley Cavell et al’s Philosophy & Animal Life, Piers Beirne’s Confronting Animal Abuse, and Paolo Cavalieri’s The Death of the Animal. My book buying budget is taped out for near future, but if Jean Kazez or her publisher wishes to send me a copy of Animalkind or Cary Wolfe and his publisher wishes to send me a copy of What is Posthumanism?, I am looking forward to reading them.

The Concepts of “Human” and “Animal”

I am working on the last parts of my dissertation and have been wondering about the concepts of human and animal. It is commonly observed in animal studies that the concept of human is constituted through the expulsion of the animal. That is, humans are humans because they are not animals. Obviously, it is recognized on some levels–even in the least thoughtful of people–that humans are, nonetheless, animal in some respect: we are living creatures in more or less the same way. However, humans are nonetheless different than animals and this (minor) difference makes all the difference in the world. Thus, if a creature can speak, it is human; if a creature cannot speak, it is animal; if a creature is made in the image of God, it is human; if a creature is not made in the image of God, it is animal. Those working in animal studies like to “complicate” this distinction. After all, the internal diversity of the two concepts suggests a greater range of difference within the category of animal than between the categories of human and animal. For instance, estimates range from between three and over thirty million distinct species captured within the category of animal (ranging from single-celled organisms, to sponges, to chickens, to gorillas), but only one species captured within the category of human. This strategy seems like a failure to me and I think it has to be with the more or less disavowed category of the pet in animal studies. It is true that animal studies scholars are disproportionately in support of animal rights as a moral theory and, thus, are disproportionately concerned with the fate of animals used for food. Gary Francione, for instance, likes to point out that just as there is no meaningful distinction between fur and leather, there is likewise no meaningful distinction between a dog and a pig. The animal rights position tends to obliterate differences between animals and, thus, between humans and animals. While this is powerful move in moral theory, it is a strange and weak move when we look at animals (or, better yet, human/animal relations) sociologically or anthropologically. (Having said this, the sociology and anthropology of human/animal relations remains comparatively underdeveloped relative to the moral theory.)

The thought that I am having difficulty expressing is that the distinction between human and animal is only marginally worth preserving, but only because we, as sociologists, tend to disavow the boundary concept between the two: viz., pets. This disavowal is clearly obvious in the only major survey of the sociology of animals, Adrian Franklin’s Animals and Modern Culures, where his analysis of pets is, in essence, that modernity creates conditions wherein intimate contact between humans breaks down, but that this intimate contact is nonetheless desired. As a result, animals become surrogate humans. Pets are both animal and human, but it is this very lack of distinction between the two categories that troubles Franklin: pets are animals, we are mistaken when we believe that they are human. He may be right, but I doubt it.

What needs to be done is to study the domain of the home more carefully (the history and sociology of the family/home tends to ignore pets, domesticated animals and vermin), especially as a site of domination. As Yi-Fu Tuan points out, pets (and topiaries) are the product of dominance and affection. It is at this point that we would want to also bring in children, servants, slaves, and parents.

I started drawing a diagram in my notebook today, attempting to make sense of these distinctions. I’ve reproduced it here. My handwriting is terrible! Obviously, I don’t intend for the diagram to be definitive, but suggestive.

OSPCA v. THS

For those interested in such things, the OSPCA has been granted a wide range of relief under the Charities Accounting Act with respect to the THS. In effect, this means that the OSPCA controls money and the animals at the THS. (Paragraph 45 is especially chilling.) This is the first legal account of evidence collected by the OSPCA and the basis for its accusations against the THS. The judgment can be read here.

Bees and Women Compared

From Richard Remnant’s 1637 classic, A Discourse or Historie of Bees.

Remembering Calvin (January 25, 2009)

Influential Texts

There have a been a few posts recently on “intellectual biography” and “influential books” (here and here), as well as expressions that this trend continue. I don’t see why I shouldn’t jump on the bandwagon as well.

For myself, unlike some of the others pursuing these sorts of posts, I wouldn’t say that there have been particular texts that have been especially influential for me in the sense of either being “life changing” or which pervasively influence my work. As I see it, much of my education came through something comparable unfashionable in post-secondary education these days–the slow and careful reading of important texts. During the first year of my PhD, I read (in chronological order of first publication) Spinoza’s Ethics, Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Tocqueville’s Democracy in America and Foucault’s The Order of Things. During my M.A. I read all three volumes of Marx’s Capital. Lastly, during the final year of my undergraduate degree, I read Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit rather closely (supplemented by the commentaries of Alexandre Kojeve,  Jean Hyppolite and H.S. Harris). While I cannot claim that they were read with any particular method in mind, Althusser’s comments in Reading Capital are appropriate: “But some day it is essential to read Capital to the letter. To read the text itself, complete, all four volumes, line by line.” Since then, I have read (for my dissertation) among other works, Thomas Hobbes’s Elemenents of Natural Law, De Cive, and Leviathan and John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government and Essay Concerning Human Understanding in this fashion. I suspect this is how I’ll continue to read well into the future.

Given my interest in the history of social and political thought as well as my interest in writing such a history, it goes without saying that I’ve found a number of texts to be particularly important in this genre: both volumes of Quentin Skinner’s The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, J.G.A. Pocock’s The Machiavellian Moment, Sheldon Wolin’s Politics and Vision, and Foucault’s lectures from the late seventies. I have also found great value in more idiosyncratic works, such as Ernst Kantorowicz’s The King’s Two Bodies, Leo Strauss’s Natural Right and History, and, perhaps more obscurely, Marc Bloch’s The Royal Touch: Sacred Monarchy and Scrofula in England and France.

Given that I am a sociologist by training, I should mention that many works of classical sociology have been important for me, especially Emile Durkheim’s Elementary Forms of Religious Life and Marcel Mauss’s Essay on the Gift. The sociological and anthropological tradition that has come out of this has likewise been important: Claude Levi-Strauss, Pierre Clastres, and Marshall Sahlins. More recently, I have found Bruno Latour’s work quite compelling (his pseudonymous “Sociology of a Door-Closer” paper remains a classic).

Those who have made it this far have no doubt noticed a complete lack of texts falling in the genre of “animal studies.” While it is an exciting field, I am not sure that any “classic” texts have emerged outside of applied ethics (e.g., Peter Singer, Tom Regan and Gary Francione). For instance, Derrida’s book is sufficiently obscure that it will not be as generally read as the applied ethics texts. Given the lack of a coherent theoretical position underlying animal studies, I can’t really name any particularly important works. However, there are a number of historical studies that are well worth reading: Harriet Ritvo’s The Animal Estate: The English and Other Creatures in the Victorian Age, Reviel Netz’s Barbed Wire: An Ecology of Modernity, and Keith Thomas’s Man and the Natural World: A History of the Modern Sensibility.

Human experimentation for animals?

Apparently all my recent posts relate to re-reading material for lecture. From Piers Beirne’s “For a Nonspeciesist Criminology: Animal Abuse as an Object of Study” (Criminology 37(1): 117-47):

Singer’s many exhortations have successfully acquired a large and quite influential following. But it must be said that his act-utilitarianism does not place the liberation of animals from suffering on very secure footing. If the rightness or wrongness of any given action is to be judged only by its consequences, and if the criterion of this is a utilitarian calculus aimed at the maximization of pleasure and the minimization of suffering, it follows that particular acts of suffering may be justified if they serve to increase the collective good. Singer’s theory of animal liberation does not condemn animal experimentation absolutely, for example, and actually supports particular instances of it if they are believed to lead to a scientific cure for illness and disease in humans. (One wonders if there are scenarios that would allow Singer to support experimentation on humans if so doing might lead to good health in sick animals.) In principle, there is nothing in such utilitarianism that would preclude any form of torture or suffering inflicted on a minority if the result was a decrease in the suffering of the majority (132).

The main thrust of the paragraph is a standard criticism of Singer in particular and utilitarianism in general–although most critics of Singer attack him on the grounds that he seems to allow for the abuse of severely handicapped humans in order to further the interests of non-handicapped humans. The parenthetical comment is, however, quite good: has anyone pursued this line of thought in general or against Singer in particular?

“Puritan Streak”

From Michael Pollan’s essay, “An Animal’s Place“:

A deep Puritan streak pervades animal rights activists, an abiding discomfort not only with our animality, but with animal’s animality too.

This is offered, I think, as a critique–the point being made by a “literary journalist” is often rather obscure, notwithstanding the rather plain prose. The problem, however, is that insofar as it is a critique in the context of his essay (as I understand it), it is completely senseless. Earlier, discussing Matthew Scully’s Dominion, he pointed out how religion can act as a check on “unfettered capitalism,” recognizing, it seems, that there are worthy considerations other than unfettered accumulation. Later, he points to animal sacrifices as rituals bringing together humans and animals. However, now, a religious streak is something to be criticized. Secondly, he points to a “discomfort” with both the animality of humans as well as the animality of animals. Fine. Discomfort, of course, implies awareness: if you weren’t aware of it, it wouldn’t make you uncomfortable. Rather than being a fault, it would seem that this “Puritan streak” is in actuality a blessing.

Later,

Granting rights to animals may lift us up from the brutal world of predation, but it will entail the sacrifice of part of our identity–our own animality.

This is puzzling: will humans not still shit and fuck? be born and die?

CFP: Foucault and Animals

Call For Abstracts: Foucault and Animals
Matthew Chrulew and Dinesh Wadiwel (Eds)

“The animal in man no longer has any value as the sign of a Beyond; it has become his madness, without a relation to anything but itself; his madness in the state of nature.”

“it is a technique of training, of dressage, that ‘despotically excludes in everything the least representation, and the smallest murmur’…”

“for millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for a political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in question.”

Michel Foucault, History of Madness; Discipline and Punish; and The Will to Knowledge.

Michel Foucault had much to say on many things, and the legacy of his thinking can be found across a diverse range of fields of inquiry, including philosophy, sociology, psychology, history, politics, architecture, health sciences, ethics and sexuality.

Yet Foucault says very little about animals. And perhaps, as a consequence, while Foucault would seem to be everywhere in social and political theory, the impact of his work is yet to be fully appreciated within the emerging field of animal studies. As has been shown in recent critical engagements with Foucault that have drawn connections with animal life, including those of Giorgio Agamben, Donna Haraway, and Roberto Esposito, Foucault’s work is extremely profitable for understanding our conflicted relationships with animals. More than another of the endless applications of his work, we believe this conjunction to be essential: both for the advancement of a new field struggling with questions of power, knowledge, and ethics; and for the study of a philosopher whose antihumanism failed to interrogate the category of species.

We are seeking abstracts from scholars engaged with Foucault and animal studies for a proposed edited book collection.

The collection will be unashamedly critical in approach, seeking to include articles that challenge systems of power which simultaneously organise conduct, violence, care and domination of nonhuman animals, from wildlife parks to factory farms. However, we also recognize there is an urgent need for indepth, inter-disciplinary theorisation that is able to map and challenge the lines of distinction between human and animal. We therefore encourage submissions from scholars working in a range of disciplines, interested in how Foucault might be used to consider human and animal relations in a broad sense. We welcome not only philosophical discussion but analysis of science, policy, and activist praxis. We encourage not simply the transfer of Foucauldian concepts but their effective adaptation to multispecies contexts.

Suggested topic areas include:

  • Biopolitics;
  • Ethics and the care of the self;
  • Power and the political;
  • Discourse and knowledge;
  • Governmentality and conduct;
  • Sovereignty and security;
  • History of biology and science;
  • Discipline, training and communication;
  • Panopticism, surveillance, gaze, spectacle;
  • Sexuality;
  • Animal subjectivities;
  • Heterotopias of interspecies contact;
  • The animality of humanity;
  • Humanism, language and the border of species.

For abstract submissions (of 500 words), or to discuss proposed contributions, please email either Matthew Chrulew at mchrulew@gmail.com or Dinesh Wadiwel at dwadiwel@gmail.com.

Abstract deadline: 28th February 2010.
Projected completed book chapter deadline: late 2010.